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LIMITS ON SCIENTIFIC EXPRESSION AND THE SCOPE
OF FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES: A COMMENT ON
PROFESSOR KAMENSHINE'S ANALYSIS
MARTIN H. REDISH*
I. INTRODUCTION: FASHIONING THE BURDEN OF PRODUCTION IN
FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
As in most cases in which free speech interests must be recon-
ciled with competing societal concerns, governmental regulation of
scientific expression may be resolved by means of one of three ba-
sic analytical models. Initially, once we have conceptually catego-
rized the subject of regulation as "speech" falling within the pro-
tection of the first amendment, we might focus exclusively on the
nature and intensity of the asserted governmental interest for reg-
ulating the expression. Under this model, we take the value of the
expression as a given, and decide whether we will demand that the
justification for regulation meet a "compelling interest" test, how
that concept is to be defined, and whether we will fashion our con-
stitutional analysis of regulation in an ad hoc fashion or by means
of a less flexible categorical approach." Secondly, we might blend
our analysis of governmental justification and expressive value. In
other words, we could first demand that the governmental interest
reach a threshold level of substantiality, and then shift the burden
of production to the speaker, requiring a showing of the value
served by the regulated expression. Under this analysis, the two
competing interests would be matched in a proportional manner:
the more compelling the governmental interest, the greater must
be the value of the speech to invalidate the regulation. Finally, we
could place the initial burden of production on the speaker: unless
and until it is determined that the challenged expression serves
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University; A.B. 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D.
1970, Harvard University.
1. See M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPREssIoN: A CRITICAL ANALysis 119-20, 193-201 (1984);
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975).
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some or all of a set of narrowly defined categories of first amend-
ment values, we will not even ask the government to explain its
justification, with the possible exception of a demonstration that
the regulation is not totally irrational.
In his Article in this symposium considering the constitutional-
ity of limitations on scientific and technological expression,2 Pro-
fessor Robert Kamenshine appears, if only implicitly, to adopt the
third mode of constitutional analysis. Not once in his article does
Professor Kamenshine ever seriously examine the specific nature of
possible governmental justifications for regulating scientific or
technological expression. Instead, the overwhelming portion of his
intellectual energy is devoted to a detailed analysis of such speech
in terms first of three conceivable first amendment values-self-
governance, marketplace of ideas and self-fulfillment 3-and then
in terms of his "alternative" theoretical analysis, which focuses
upon "the legitimate role of government toward the mind of each
individual."4
Such a mode of constitutional analysis effectively stands the first
amendment on its head, in total disregard of the amendment's
strongly protective language5 and the fundamental role that free
expression was designed to play in American society. Not surpris-
ingly, Professor Kamenshine's analysis leads him to a grossly un-
derprotective result: communication that looks like speech, smells
like speech, and tastes like speech, is effectively treated as if it is
not speech at all; in most cases, according to Professor Kamen-
shine, regulation of scientific and technological communication
"should be reviewed as ordinary regulations of liberty under a
standard requiring only a rational relationship to a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective."6 It is only where scientific and technological
speech is regulated with the purpose or effect of skewing debate on
public policy issues that the regulations must be subjected to strict
2. Kamenshine, Embargoes on Exports of Ideas and Information: First Amendment Is-
sues, 26 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 863 (1985).
3. Id. at 867-73.
4. Id. at 876-81.
5. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .. " U.S. CONsT. amend 1.
6. Kamenshine, supra note 2, at 876.
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review.7 Professor Kamenshine reaches this conclusion, despite the
facts that scientific inquiry and expression are, in every intuitive
sense, easily categorized as protected speech, and that whatever
important governmental interests that may exist could most likely
be accommodated by a traditional first amendment "compelling
interest" standard.
Even if one were to accept Professor Kamenshine's decision to
place the initial burden of production on the speaker, one still
need not accept his underprotective conclusion. For in making his
initial examination of scientific and technological expression in
terms of the list of first amendment values as he sees them, Profes-
sor Kamenshine engages in several logical fallacies, discussion of
which forms the basis for the remainder of this commentary.
Bfriefly, these fallacies are the following:
1. Professor Kamenshine incorrectly assumes that the goal
of avoiding governmental control of the individual's mind ex-
hausts the interests the first amendment should be thought to
serve.
2. He fails to explain why scientific expression having an im-
pact on public policy is deemed to be more worthy of first
amendment protection than similar expression that does not
have such an impact.
3. Even if one were to assume that speech having an impact
upon public policy is somehow more worthy of first amend-
ment protection, he has failed to provide an operational or
functional definition of the concept of "public policy."
4. Even if one were to assume that speech related to matters
of "public policy" is more valuable, he has failed to explain
why the determination of which factors are important to is-
sues of public policy is to be made by an organ of the govern-
ment, rather than by members of the public themselves.
In addition to these four criticisms of Professor Kamenshine's
analysis, I will also discuss an additional theoretical obstacle to a
proper understanding of the role of the first amendment in moni-
toring regulation of scientific expression-one which Professor
Kamenshine describes but does not openly endorse. This is the
7. Id. at 879-81.
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view that scientific expression disseminated in a commercial con-
text or for commercial motives is to be treated as less protected
"commercial speech."
II. VIEWPOINT REGULATION AND FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY:
AVOIDING THE "NECESSARY-SUFFICIENT" FALLACY
Though Professor Kamenshine appears to recognize the rele-
vance to first amendment theory of several traditionally recognized
first amendment values,8 his central theoretical assumption is that
"it is almost always invalid for the government either as an end in
itself or as a means to an end, to shape the public's thinking by
regulating communication. . . . The business of government does
not include using its regulatory power to shape a political view-
point."" This theoretical assumption leads Professor Kamenshine
to the logical conclusion that if government regulates expression
for some reason unrelated to the desire to control the individual's
mind, for example, for the purpose of protecting national security,
first amendment interests are generally not implicated.' 0
Professor Kamenshine never explains why he believes avoidance
of governmental control of the mind is central to the first amend-
ment. He apparently believes he can avoid this task, simply by
describing his claim as a "premise."" But it is not difficult to un-
derstand why governmental attempts to control the individual's
mind by regulating the expression of particular viewpoints would
be thought to violate the first amendment: governmental control of
the individual's mind violates the principle of individual integrity
and free will that the concept of individual self-realization-itself
inherent in the structure of the first amendment and modern lib-
eral democratic theory-dictates. 2 The first amendment stands as
a barrier between the individual and government; it is therefore
not surprising that it prohibits governmental interference with the
individual's mental processes.
8. Kamenshine, supra note 2, at 867.
9. Id. at 876.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 19-26; Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its
Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 81, 103
(1978).
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To the extent that Professor Kamenshine employs his premise
for purposes of inclusion, then, no first amendment scholar could
have serious quarrel with his position. However, to the extent that
Professor Kamenshine employs his premise to exclude from effec-
tive first amendment protection all expression regulated for some
noncensorial purpose, his analysis suffers from what can only be
described as the "necessary-sufficient" fallacy.13 At most, all Pro-
fessor Kamenshine has established is that a censorial purpose for
governmental regulation is a "sufficient" condition for first amend-
ment invalidation; he has not logically established that a censorial
purpose is a "necessary" condition for such invalidation. The point
is that grounds wholly apart from censorial governmental motiva-
tion may exist for invalidating governmental regulation of expres-
sion. Indeed, as I have argued in greater detail elsewhere, 4
whatever values are served by protecting free expression are un-
derminded by the end result of a limitation on expression, regard-
less of the purpose for the governmental regulation. To be sure, if
the asserted governmental justification establishes a truly compel-
ling interest, regulation of expression may be constitutionally per-
missible, notwithstanding a negative impact on expression. But
this no way frees such noncensorial regulations from the strict
scrutiny of the first amendment. For example, an ordinance
prohibiting anyone from saying anything about anything, in order
to preserve the quiet of the neighborhood, surely undermines first
amendment values, despite the absence of a censorial motivation
for the regulation.
In his oral comments at this symposium, Professor Frederick
Schauer argued that the dichotomy in the level of first amendment
protection is more appropriately viewed as one between govern-
mental regulations aimed directly at the communicative impact of
expression and those aimed at noncommunicative factors but hav-
ing an incidental impact on expression. He suggested that only the
former truly undermines first amendment interests.
This dichotomy represents a significant modification of the
traditional "content-based/content-neutral" division; regulations
aimed directly at communicative impact may be unconcerned with
13. See generally M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 102-14.
14. Id.
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the content, or viewpoint, being regulated. For example, the hypo-
thetical ordinance prohibiting all expression at all times 15 would be
subjected only to limited scrutiny under the content distinction,
yet presumably would receive a much stricter form of scrutiny
under Professor Schauer's dichotomy, because the ordinance is
clearly aimed directly at expression. In contrast, an example of a
law having only an incidental impact on expression, under Profes-
sor Schauer's dichotomy, would be an ordinance prohibiting any-
one from stepping on the flowers in the park, applied to would-be
picketers. Thus, Professor Schauer's dichotomy actually would
provide a strict level of scrutiny to a considerably larger portion of
expression regulation than would the viewpoint dichotomy, largely
endorsed by Professor Kamenshine.
Ironically, however, in extending the reach of first amendment
protection Professor Schauer has effectively given away the store.
Although the viewpoint dichotomy has the support of at least an
arguably valid premise-that governmental rejection of expression
solely due to distaste for the viewpoint expressed is somehow
deemed fundamentally more offensive to first amendment values
than other forms of regulation l'-there would seem to be abso-
lutely no logical basis to support Professor Schauer's dichotomy.
Of course, I have argued that not even the arguably valid premise
behind the strict content distinction should be accepted."7 But any
dichotomy premised on whether the effect on speech of a govern-
mental regulation is direct or incidental places form over sub-
stance. As long as the regulation of speech is not motivated by dis-
agreement with the substance of the communication, it is difficult
to imagine why regulation aimed directly at expression is more in-
vidious than regulation having only an indirect impact on expres-
sion. In both situations, government might have a compelling justi-
fication for limiting expression, and in both situations the harm to
the values served by free expression could conceivably be substan-
tial. Perhaps one might attempt to fashion a linguistic argument,
contending that by its terms the first amendment prohibits only
laws "abridging" the freedom of speech. But no reason exists to
15. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
16. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
17. M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 102-14.
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believe that laws not aimed directly at, but having a negative im-
pact on, expression are not conceptually classifiable as "abridge-
ments" of speech.
Perhaps one might argue that Professor Schauer's dichotomy de-
rives from a concern that government not gratuitously discriminate
against expression. Under this analysis, first amendment interests
are satisfied, as long as government gives expression treatment
that is no worse than that given other interests.'s Surely the first
amendment requires more of government than treatment of ex-
pression that is no worse than that given other interests. In fact,
the whole point of the first amendment was to make clear that ex-
pression is deserving, not of equal treatment, but rather of special
treatment from government. Otherwise, the interests in speech
could easily have been left to the considerably more diluted protec-
tion of the fifth amendment.19 That it was not, but instead was
given the obviously much stronger protection of the first amend-
ment,20 clearly indicates the Framers' understanding that speech
must receive more protection than simply the prevention of gov-
ernmental discrimination against speech. Thus, neither Professor
Schauer's "direct-incidental" dichotomy nor Professor Kamen-
shine's viewpoint distinction can ultimately withstand theoretical
analysis. Therefore any conclusion that regulation of speech is per-
missible because it is justified by the interest in national security
(as Professor Kamenshine believes), or because it regulates inter-
ests other than speech as well (as Professor Schauer believes),
must be rejected.
III. AvOIDING THE "PUBLIC POLICY" TRAP
Though Professor Kamenshine's theory leads him to conclude
that much regulation of scientific expression justified on national
security grounds is permissible if it meets the extremely deferen-
18. Professor Schauer appears to adopt a similar analysis in his treatment of the "public
figure" issue in defamation, where he compares legislative regulation to regulation of the
manufacture of pharmaceuticals, in total disregard of the fact that the former is protected
by the first amendment while the latter is not. See Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WK & MARY
L. REv. 905, 925-28 (1984).
19. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend V.
20. See supra note 5.
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tial "rational basis" standard,2 in certain instances he would ex-
tend such expression greater protection. He would do this in a situ-
ation in which "no illicit purpose can be established but where the
information to be suppressed. . .has a relationship to existing is-
sues of public policy or would tend to create such an issue, espe-
cially by discrediting a position advanced by government spokes-
men." 22 However, where there is "no adverse impact on any debate
involving public policy ' 23 (which, he suggests, includes "most sci-
entific and technological information"), 24 "subject to a rational ba-
sis review by the courts, the government appropriately may bal-
ance the adverse impact on scientific development and self-
fulfillment against the national security interest. '25
As is unfortunately true of much of Professor Kamenshine's
analysis, he fails to explain in any detail why scientific expression
linked to a "public policy" debate is thought to be so much more
worthy of first amendment protection that it alone receives the
benefit of the strict scrutiny test. He does argue that "regulation
suppressing a political view, regardless of the regulation's objec-
tive, poses a direct and immediate threat to the process by which
the people maintain some check on all government activities. '26
But nowhere in his article does Professor Kamenshine explain why
speech that fosters a popular check on government is so much
more valuable than expression fostering intellectual development.
Perhaps Professor Kamenshine intended implicitly to incorpo-
rate the theories of Judge Bork" and Professor Meiklejohn, 2s both
of whom believed that speech related to the political process is the
sole form of expression worthy of first amendment protection.
However, as I have demonstrated in previous writing,29 both theo-
ries are defective, and even Professor Meiklejohn ultimately ac-
knowledged that the concept of "political" could not be so nar-
21. Kamenshine, supra note 2, at 879.
22. Id. at 880.
23. Id. at 879.
24. Id. at 880.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 879.
27. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
28. A. MEIKLFJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
29. See M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 14-26.
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rowly defined as to exclude such subjects as literature and
science.30 The writings of both Bork and Meiklejohn have been
subjected to such substantial criticism over the years, 31 that if Pro-
fessor Kamenshine actually intends to rely on their analyses, it is
incumbent upon him at least to attempt to respond to those
criticisms.
However, even if one were to accept Professor Kamenshine's as-
sumption that in theory speech related to "public policy" debate is
more worthy of first amendment protection, he has failed to pro-
vide even the most basic definitional structure of the concept. In-
deed, it is highly unlikely that one could be effectively fashioned.
The problem is that speech does not come in neatly packaged
segments.
This is especially so when the issue is whether particular expres-
sion has relevance to an issue of public policy. Even if one could
fashion some objective standard for defining the concept, any gov-
ernmentally imposed measure of what is probative on matters of
public policy is inherently violative of the concept of individual in-
tegrity and free will, upon which democracy and free speech are
premised.2 The Supreme Court has recognized as much in the
area of first amendment protection of defamation of public offi-
cials.3 It is simply inappropriate for government to dictate to
members of the public what should or should not influence their
political judgments.3
IV. SCIENTIFIC EXPRESSION AND THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH PROBLEM
Though Professor Kamenshine does not himself endorse the po-
sition, he describes the view of other commentators who, while ex-
tending considerably greater protection to scientific expression
than Kamenshine himself does, nevertheless reduce that protection
when scientific expression is disseminated for commercial rea-
30. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. Rav. 245.
31. See, e.g., Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theorty and Doctrine, 78 Nw.
U. L. Rav. 1137, 1162-67 (1983); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An
Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. RM. 299, 317 (1978).
32. See M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 9-86.
33. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1971).
34. See M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 9-86.
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sons.3 5 Such an approach misconceives the concept of commercial
speech and unduly dilutes the level of protection given to speech
that is worthy of the full reach of the first amendment.
Of all first amendment commentators, I am perhaps the most
extreme in my views on the constitutional protection of commer-
cial speech. As my previous writing has indicated,36 I am of the
opinion that even pure commercial speech-i.e., advertising for
commercial products-is deserving of full first amendment protec-
tion, because it facilitates the exercise of one's private self-govern-
ment and aids in the development of one's intellectual capacities,
and thus contributes as much as other forms of protected expres-
sion to the first amendment value of self-realization. But one need
not go nearly so far to reject the view that fully protected scientific
expression somehow loses first amendment value when dissemi-
nated for commercial purposes. Such an analysis obviously proves
too much: once it is accepted, it is difficult to distinguish books,
newspapers, and magazines, published and sold for profitmaking
purposes. Yet such a conclusion would effectively gut the first
amendment, for many people make their living by engaging in first
amendment activity.
The Supreme Court has not accepted this position. In response
to the argument, made in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 7 that
the advertisement in the Times constituted unprotected commer-
cial speech, the Court responded that the fact that the Times was
paid for the ad was as irrelevant for first amendment purposes as
the fact that books are sold.38 From whatever theoretical perspec-
tive one adopts, such a conclusion clearly was correct. The position
that scientific expression becomes commercial speech when dis-
seminated for commercial purposes, then, is directly contrary to
precedent, logic, and first amendment policy.
V. CONCLUSION
The constitutional issues surrounding governmental regulation
of scientific expression are by no means unimportant. Government
35. See Kamenshine, supra note 2, at 879-81.
36. See M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 60-68.
37. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
38. Id. at 266.
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conceivably may assert interests of national security that, in cer-
tain instances, are far from insubstantial, and which the courts
may have considerable difficulty questioning. Yet if the judiciary is
to serve any role as an independent protector of first amendment
rights against incursion by the majoritarian branches of govern-
ment, surely the conclusory assertion of national security as a jus-
tification for governmental limitation of expression cannot end the
inquiry. The Supreme Court implicitly recognized as much in the
Pentagon Papers case.39 Thus, any scholarly effort that hopes to
contribute to our understanding of first amendment limitations on
governmental power to regulate scientific expression should focus
upon the nature of the specific conceivable justifications for regula-
tion and upon the task facing the judiciary in attempting to moni-
tor such regulations.
Because Professor Kamenshine improperly reverses the burden
of production in first amendment analysis, however, he never es-
capes the constitutional trap that he has unwittingly set for him-
self. For the analytical mode he adopts forces him to focus primar-
ily, if not exclusively, on the issue of the first amendment value of
the expression sought to be regulated. As a result, he fails to focus
upon the difficult, nitty-gritty issues inherent in the balancing pro-
cess, and therefore fails significantly to advance the constitutional
inquiry.
39. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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